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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

.

CaseNo.20000071-CA

:

Priority No. 2

vs.
SEAN THOMPSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1999).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether Utah Code Annotated 76-9-201 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied?
A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness.
State v. Mohi, 901 P. 2d 991,995 (Utah 1995). Moreover, this Court should apply "strict scrutiny"
to this case as it impacts freedom of speech as located in the and First Amendment. See, St. George
v. Turner, 860 P.2d 929,932 (Utah 1993).
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201
(1)
A person is guilty of telephone harassment and subject to prosecution in the
jurisdiction where the telephone call originated or was received if with intent to annoy, alarm
another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten harass, or frighten any person at the called
number or recklessly creating a risk thereof, the person:
(a) makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues;
(b) makes repeated telephone calls, whether or not a conversation ensues, or
after having been told not call back, causes the telephone of another to ring
repeatedly or continuously;
(c) makes a telephone cal and insults, taunts, or challenges the recipient of the
telephone call or any person at the called number in a manner likely to
provoke a violent or disorderly response;
(d) makes a telephone call and uses any lewd or profane language or suggests
any lewd or lacivious act; or
(e) makes a telephone call and threatens to inflict injury, physical harm, or
damage to any person or the property of any person.
(2) Telephone harassment is a class B misdemeanor.
United States Constitution, Amendment I
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of
grievances.

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV
....No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person, of life
liberty or property, without due process flaw; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

Utah Constitution, Article I, § 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

2
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Utah Constitution, Article I, § 15
No person shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the
press....
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Sean P. Thompson appeals from a bench trial conviction of Telephone Harassment, a class
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201, as adopted by Provo City.
A.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court

On or about May 1, 1999, Thompson was charged by Information with Telephone
Harassment, a class B misdemeanor, in Fourth District Court, Provo Department.
On October 29, 1999, a bench trial was held before the Honorable Anthony W. Schofield.
After testimony from the alleged victim, the responding officer, and Thompson, the Court ruled in
favor of the City of Provo and convicted Thompson of telephone harassment. On December 20,
1999, Thomson was sentenced to 15 hours of community service and a $250 fine. On January 19,
2000, Thompson filed a notice of appeal in the Fourth District Court.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In the bench trial the alleged victim, Ms. Thayer, testified that Thompson called numerous
times within the hour.(Tr. At 7). Thayer testified that she asked Thompson to cease his phone
calls.(Tr. At 8) The responding police officer, Bastian, testified that while he was at the home of
Thayer investigating the telephone calls, Thompson again called, wherein Bastian picked up the
receiver and spoke with Thompson.(Tr. at 13). Bastian requested to meet with Thompson at
Thompson's home.(Tr. at 14). Upon arriving at Thompson5 s home Bastian indicated that he smelled
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alcohol and Thompson admitted to drinking beer.(Tr. at 14).
Thompson took the stand and testified that he received a telephone callfromThayer and she
told Thompson that she was going to harm herself (suicide) and possibly harm Thompson's
daughter.'(Tr. at 17 & 20). Thompson testified that he called Thayer numerous times because he
feared Thayer was a danger to herself and to Thompson's daughter.(Tr. at 21). Thompson repeatedly
called Thayer because he was taught in school to keep calling to assist the person threatening
suicide.(Tr. at 20).
Mr. Means was appointed to be defense counsel for Mr. Thompson by the 4th District Court
in May, 1999. Mr. Means told Mr. Thompson that he would be in contact with him in order to
prepare for the trial which was to be held in October 1999. Over the months before trial, Mr. Means
never called Mr. Thompson, in fact the only contact was initiated by a worried Mr. Thompson a few
days before he was to be back in court. Instead of immediately meeting with his client to prepare
his case, Mr. Means asked Mr. Thompson to meet with him at the courthouse about half and hour
before they were to appear before the court for the trial. Mr. Thompson arrived early, and waited
for his attorney, and Mr. Means showed up with only a few minutes before they were to be in court.
As they were reviewing a few factual issues in preparation for trial, they were called into the
courtroom unprepared.
In meeting with Mr. Means, the Appellant, Mr. Thompson provided substantial evidence that
would support his innocence. Mr. Thompson had evidence of a prior occasion in which Ms. Thayer
threatened to kill herself and all passengers and all the passengers who were with her while she was
driving a car.
1

Mr. Thompson felt that this evidence would surely have an impact on the trial,

The alleged victim and Thompson were recently divorced and are parents of a daughter.
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tending to prove that Mr. Thompson was indeed acting with the best of intentions to prevent anyone
from getting hurt by repeatedly calling Ms. Thayer while she was contemplating suicide. Mr. Means
did not use this evidence to impeach Ms. Thayer when she claimed that she had never been suicidal
in her life. (Tr. at 27).
Mr. Thompson had evidence that he called Ms. Thayer only in response to her initial call to
him. His return calls were only due to the call which wasfirstmade to him. During trial, Ms. Thayer
claimed that she did not call Mr. Thompson on the night in question. (Tr. at 10). She later admitted
that she did indeed call Mr. Thompson that day. (Tr. at 27).
Due to the lack of evidence and lack of effort on the part of Mr. Means, Mr. Thompson was
found guilty of telephone harassment. (Tr. at 33).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Since the Utah Court of Appeals has declared applicable sections of Utah Code Annotated
§76-9-201 unconstitutional, Thompson asks that this Court reverse the conviction. The facts of this
case provide standing for Thompson to challenge the telephone harassment statute's
constitutionality. The telephone harassment statute in this case has a real and substantial deterrent
effect on protected speech and a court's narrowing construction of the statute is not possible.
Because the statute is overbroad and vague it must be stricken down because it violates the
guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution as well as
Article I, §§ 7 and 15 of the Utah Constitution. Given the above the telephone harassment statute
cannot be applied to Thompson or anyone else.

5
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Appellant Sean Thompson was denied due process by the poor effort put forth by Mr. Means
as his defense attorneys who was appointed to defend the Appellant. Mr. Means failed to contact
Mr. Thompson as promised.
Mr. Means also failed to consider or prepare any kind of defense on his behalf. Mr. Means
disregarded the considerable amount of evidence that Mr. Thompson brought to his attention
regarding a different occasion in which Ms. Thayer threatened suicide and homicide. Mr. Means,
though bound by a duty to do so, did not investigate this evidence.
When Ms. Thayer claimed that she had never been suicidal (Tr. at 27), Mr. Means, though
he had been informed of her prior bad act, failed to attempt to impeach her by bringing up her prior
threats. In addition, after the State's principal witness for its case in chief gave contradictory
statements from the stand, Mr. Means did not even try to impeach the witness. Such a blatant failure
to render effective assistance of counsel constitutes a severe infringement on Mr. Thompson's right
to counsel and due process.
ARGUMENT
I.

THOMPSON'S CONVICTION OF TELEPHONE HARASSMENT SHOULD
BE REVERSED BECAUSE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §76-9-201 HAS BEEN
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE AND AS APPLIED
Recently this court has ruled on the issue of Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201 in Provo City

v. Whatcott. Provo v. Whatcott. 1 P.3d 1113, (Ut. App. 2000). In Whatcott, this court ruled that
provisions within Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201 are overbroad, Id. at 6. A statute that is
determined to be unconstitutional on its face must be stricken down in its entirety, disallowing the
statute to be applied against Thompson or anyone else. Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d at
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459(Utah 1989); Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d at 1377(Utah App. 1990). Given this court's recent
ruling, which is on point, Thompson's conviction should be reversed.
In General
Speech is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as
Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution.2
D.

Standing
A defendant has "general standing" when he can show " 'some distinct and palpable injury

that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute.' " Willden, 768 P2d. at 456
(quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983)). Thompson was convicted under
Utah's telephone harassment statute demonstrating he "indisputably has standing to challenge the
ordinance, at least as it has been applied to him." Willden, 768 P.2d at 457.
Thompson also has standing to challenge the statute on its face as to the statute's
constitutional validity. A statute may be held facially invalid even if it can be applied legitimately
in the facts of this particular case. Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372 (Utah App. 1990). Upon
a determination that the statute is unconstitutional on its face the statute must be stricken down in
its entirety, disallowing the statute to be applied against Thompson or anyone else. Willden, 768
P.2d at 459; Huber, 786 P.2d at 1377.
Generally, a person may not challenge the facial validity of a statute on grounds that it may
conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others not before the court. State v. Haig, 578 P. 2d

2

Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution provides in part "No law shall be passed to
abridge or restrain the freedom of speech ...." and has been interpreted as granting at least as
much protection as the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.. KUTV, Inc. v.
Conder, 668 P.2d 513 (Utah 1983).
7
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837, 841 (Utah 1978). However, this is not so when we are dealing with First Amendment
protections. The First Amendment overbreadth and vagueness standing doctrines represent a
departure from the traditional rule. The doctrines are designed to give standing to anyone who is
subject to an overbroad or vague statute that chills the exercise of First Amendment rights of others.
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521,92 S.Ct. 1103,1105, 31 L.Ed.2d 408; Willden, 768 P.2d at
457. The doctrine "gives a defendant standing to challenge a statute on behalf of others not before
the court even if the law could be constitutionally applied to the defendant." Salt Lake City v. Lopez,
935,P.2d 1259,1263n.2(Ut.Ct. App. 1997);SeeBigelowv. Virginia, 421 U.S.809,816,95S.Ct.
222,2230,44 L.Ed.2d600 (1975);Broadrickv. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,612,93 S. Ct. 2908,2916,
37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837, 840 (Utah 1978). The rationale for this
exception is that the First Amendment rights infringed upon are so important that their protection
need not wait for the perfect litigant. Willden, 768 P.2d at 457. Hence, a defendant does have
standing to challenge the statute on grounds of both unconstitutional overbreadth and vagueness as
applied to others. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 521,92 S. Ct. at 1105. When faced with First Amendment
overbreadth and vagueness attacks on a statute, this Court should first address overbreadth. Logan
City v. Huber, 786 P. 2d 1372,1375 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990).
B.

Overbreadth
The Supreme Court has stated that when a statute or ordinance aims at penalizing an

unprotected class of speech, it "must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish
only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression." Gooding,
405 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. at 1106; See Huber, 786 P.2d at 1375. The constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech do not allow the government to punish words outside of "narrowly limited classes
8
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of speech." Huber 786 P.2d at 1374. An overbroad enactment is one "'which does not aim
specifically at evils within the allowable area of state control, but, on the contrary, sweeps within its
ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or
the press.' " Huber, 786 P.2d at 1375 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,97,60 S.Ct. 736,
741-42, 84 L.Ed. 1093(1940)).
The merit of a First Amendment overbreadth challenge is determined by analyzing two
factors: (1) Whether the statute's " 'deterrent effect on legitimate expression is both real and
substantial;': and (2) Whether the statute is' readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state
courts.5 " State v. Haig 578 P.2d 837, 841 (Utah 1978) (quoting Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville,
All U.S. 205,216,95 S.Ct. 2268,2276,45 L.Ed,2d 125(1975)). If the statute's deterrent effect on
protected expression is both real and substantial and the statute is not readily subject to a narrowing
construction by state courts then it is unconstitutionally overbroad.
1.

Substantial Deterrent Effect.

Utah's telephone harassment statute has a real and substantial deterrent effect on protected
speech. For example, the statute precludes one from making a telephone call with intent to "alarm"
another. The deterrent effect of this language on constitutionally protected speech has no limits.
This overbroad choice of words conceivably makes it criminal in Utah to call one's neighbor and
warn him that his house is on fire, or to call a friend and forecast an approaching storm. See Bolles
v. People, 541 P.2d 80, 83 (Col.' 1975) (en banc).
The statute also precludes one from making a telephone call with intent to "annoy" another.
There are many instances where one may call another with the intention of causing a slight
annoyance for perfectly legitimate constitutionally protected purposes. Conceivably, this statute
9
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could make criminal a single telephone call made by the following individuals: a consumer who
wishes to express dissatisfaction over the performance of a produce or service; a businessman
disturbed with another's failure to perform a contractual obligation; an irate citizen who wishes to
complain to a public official; an individual bickering over family matters; or a creditor seeking to
collect payment of a past due bill. See People v. Klick. 362 N.E.2d 329, 331-32 (111. 1977).
The term "harass"3 as used in the statute is merely a persistent annoyance and should be
considered on the same guidelines as "annoy". Conceivably, this statute could make criminal
repeated telephone calls made by the following individuals: a consumer who wishes to express
dissatisfaction over the performance of a produce or service that continues to fail after being
repaired. Indeed the "lemon laws" to handle such situations expect the dissatisfaction of a consumer
who expresses dissatisfaction on more than one occasion.; a businessman disturbed with another's
failure to perform a contractual obligation after being told once of the dissatisfaction but because of
no change behavior must call back and "harass"; or even a person/therapist/police officer attempting
to stop a suicide and calling back to ensure the person does not harm herself.
ThefirstAmendment is made of "sterner stuff." Bolles, P.2d at 83. The people of Utah must
not live in continual fear that something they say over the telephone with intent to "annoy", "harass",
"offend ", or "alarm" the listener will invoke the statute. Free speech may best fulfill its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with present conditions or even
stirs people to anger. Coxv. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,551-52,85 S.Ct. 453,462-63,13 L.Ed.2d471
(1965).

3

Meriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, "Harass - lb - annoy
persistently."
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Unquestionably, the State of Utah has a legitimate and substantial interest in protecting its
residents from fear and abuse at the hands of persons who employ the telephone to torment others.
United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3rd Cir. 1978); Klick, 362 N.E.2d at 331. The State
also has a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of its residents' homes from the intrusion of
unwanted and perverse phone calls. City of Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617, 619 (Wash. Ct. App.
1984). However, the means chosen by the legislature to address these interests sweep to broadly.
Clearly, the legislature failed in its duty to employ the least drastic means available to achieve these
purposes. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,488, 81 S.Ct. 247,252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960).
First of all, Utah's telephone harassment statute is not limited to intrusions into the home.
Furthermore, it is not limited to communications which abuse the listener "in an essentially
intolerable manner" as required by the Constitution when the government seeks to "shut off
discourse solely to protect others from hearing it." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,21, 91 S.Ct.
1780,1786,29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971). Plainly, the statute lacks the "precision of regulation" required
by a statute "so closely touching our most precious freedoms." NAACPv. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438,
83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9 L.Ed.2d (405) (1963). Thus, the deterrent effect of the statute on legitimate
speech is both real and substantial.
2.

Narrowing Judicial Construction.

Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201 is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the
State's courts. While Utah courts favor construing a law so as to carry out its legislative intent and
avoiding constitutional conflicts, it will not rewrite a statute or ignore its plain intent. Provo City
Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455,458 (Utah 1989); Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259,1262 (Ut,
Ct. App. 1997); Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372,1377 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). One may argue that
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the statue should be narrowly construed to prohibit phone calls made "with intent to annoy, alarm
... or frighten any person ...," but only when made for no lawful purpose. While such a narrowing
construction of the statute may eliminate some of its constitutional inadequacies, it is clear that the
legislature did not intend to qualify the statute in that manner. In 1994, the statute was amended to
delete the words "without purpose of lawful communications." Hence, narrowly construing the
statute to apply only in situations where the phone call was made for now lawful purpose would do
"impermissible violence to the clear language of the ordinance," Willden, 768 P.2d at 45 8, and would
be contrary to the legislature's plain intent.
3.

Examples of Overbroad Telephone Harassment Statutes:

Several courts have held statutes similar to the one at issue here to be unconstitutional on
grounds of overbreadth. E.g., People v. Klick, 362 N.E. 2d 329 (111. 1977); Bolles v. People, 541
P.2d 80 (Colo. 1975) (en banc); City ofEverett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). The
language of these statutes and Utah's statute is clearly distinguishable from the narrowly tailored
telephone harassment statutes that were upheld in Iowa v. Jaeger, 249 N.W. 2d 688 (Iowa 1977),
Jones v. Municipality ofAnchorage, 754 P.2d 275 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988), and Arizona v. Hagen,
558 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976). Similar to Utah's statute, these statutes specified the intent with
which the call must be made; however, contrary to Utah's statute, these valid statutes also specify
the nature of the speech prohibited (e.g., obscene, lewd, profane, and threatening).4 The categories
of language prohibited by these statues are consistent with those held to be unprotected by the

"The statues upheld in Jaeger and Hagen read as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any
person, with intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy or offend, to telephone another
and use obscene, lewd or profane language or suggest any lewd or lascivious act, or threat to in
flict injury or physical harm to the person or property of any person" (emphasis added).
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Constitution in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568? 572, 625 S.Ct. 766,769,86 L.Ed.1031
(1942). Subsections 1(a) and (b) of Utah's telephone harassment statute, on the other hand, make
no attempt to specify the nature of speech prohibited. As in the case at hand subsections (a) and (b)
directly apply.
C. Vagueness
If this Court determines that Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201 is unconstitutionally
overbroad, it may be held facially invalid and this Court need not even address the vagueness
challenge. However, if the overbreadth challenge fails then this Court should next examine the facial
vagueness challenge. Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1375,1377 n.13 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990).
Virtually every potentially vague term used in Utah's telephone harassment statute has been
challenged in one State or another. The court's decisions have been anything but consistent.5
Usually, however, statutes containing similarly vague terms such as "annoy" and "alarm" or "lewd"
and "profane" are upheld by the courts. This is largely due to the clarifying effects of other statutory
elements or because of the willingness of courts to impose narrowing judicial constructions on the
terms; the survival of the statutes can hardly be attributed to the precision of the terms themselves.
M. Sean Royall, Constitutionally Regulating Telephone Harassment: An Exercise in Statutory
Precision, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1403,1412 (Fall 1989). The Case of State v. L.G.W., 641 P.2d 127,

5

Compare, e.g., State v. Sanderson, 575 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), City of
Everett v. Moore, 683 P.2d 617, 619 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984), and People v. Norman, 703 P.2d
1261,1266 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (statues containing the phrase "alarms or seriously annoys"
were found void for vagueness; with Kinney v. State. 404 N.E. 2d 49, 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) and
Donley v. City ofMountain Brook, 429 S.2d 603, 611 (Ala. Cr. App. 1982) (upholding two
nearly identical statutes).
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131 (Utah 1982), is an example of the Utah Supreme Court applying such a narrowing construction
on the term "lewdness" to avoid its inherent vagueness.
While there is no hard and fast rule indicating which words are vague and which ones are not,
one may look to the purposes of the vagueness doctrine to determine whether the terms used in the
statute at hand are indeed vague. The vagueness doctrine declares a law unconstitutional if persons
"' of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' "
U.S. v. Lanier, _

U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1225, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (quoting Connolly v.

General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385,391,46 S.Ct. 126,127,70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)). The doctrine
reflects the principle that no person should be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could
not reasonably understand to be forbidden. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. at 1225. The reasons for the doctrine
are three fold. Two of those reasons address Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns and the
third addresses First amendment interests:
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct we
insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them . . . . Third but
related, where a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms
it operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms.
Graynedv. CityofRockford, 408 U.S. 104,108-09,92 S. Ct. 2294 2298-99-33 L.Ed.2d 222(1972);
See West Valley City v. Streeter, 849 P.2d 613,615 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993).
With regard to the First Amendment vagueness concerns, the Supreme Court has intimated
that "stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a
potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at his peril here, because
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the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser." Smithv. California, 361 U.S. 147,151, 80 S.Ct.
215, 217-18, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1960).
Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-201 prohibits an actor from using a telephone to "annoy, alarm
another, intimidate, offend, abuse, threaten, harass, or frighten any person at the called number, or
recklessly creating a risk thereof ...." Consequently, a caller could be prosecuted for espousing
Catholic doctrine that offends a Mormon recipient, or for frightening a child at the called number
who might overhear [e.g., through a speaker phone] a discussion of frightening scenes from
Hannibal, or alarm a neighbor by informing him about a proposed property tax increase, or harass
a friend by suggesting he will be whipped at the next game of pick-up neighborhood basketball, and
so on, and so on, and so on .... The all encompassing language of the statute's specific intent
provisions does not put one on adequate notice of when the content of a single call might be
prohibited. When can one probe religious doctrine before the recipient is offended such that the call
becomes criminal? Is it a crime if a child at the called number is frightened by a discussion of one's
war experience? How does a caller know where to draw the line when calling about political topics
which might alarm the listener" This statute simply does not provide one with a fair and
understandable warning of when a crime will occur and how to avoid committing it.
The vagueness doctrine also exists to prevent arbitrary law enforcement and to prevent the
inhibition of First Amendment freedoms. In fact, the requirement that a legislature establish ckar
guidelines to govern law enforcement is more important that providing fair notice. Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); See Greenwood v.
City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 716, 819 (Utah 1991). The lack of clear guidelines in the
telephone harassment statute (ordinance) gives law enforcement unbounded discretion to apply the
15
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vague law selectively and also subjects the exercise offreespeech to an unascertainable standard.
Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174,178 (5th Cir. 1983).
Lastly, because they may not know what exactly it means to "annoy", "harass", "alarm", or
"offend" another, citizens of Utah may inhibit their speech to avoid the risk of being victimized by
arbitrary law enforcement. Since a statute that is capable of reaching First Amendment freedoms
demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts, the statute should be stricken on
vagueness grounds. Smith, 361 U.S. at 151, 80 S. Ct. at 217-18.
If this Court determines that the statute is facially vague, it may cure the statute's vagueness
by instructing the jury in a way that sufficiently limits the meaning of the statute. Kramer, 712 F.2d
at 178, n. 6. For example, the court may clearly define for the jury what it means to "annoy",
"harass", "alarm", or to "offend" another and precisely what "lewd" or "profane" language is. In
fact, a court is "obliged to seek to construe a criminal statute to give specific content to terms that
might otherwise be unconstitutionally vague." State v. L.G.W., 641 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1982). If
the statute, as authoritatively construed by the court, passes constitutional scrutiny then it will not
be overturned on vagueness grounds. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73, 62 S.
Ct., 766, 769-770, 86 L.Ed.

1031 (1942). However, as argued above, the terms "lewd",

"lascivious", and "profane", even if adequately defined for the jury, have no application to the facts
of this case. Additionally, the terms "annoy", "harass", "alarm", and "offend" are not susceptible
to one comprehensive definition thatfitsall factual settings but have different thresholds for different
persons in different settings. For instance, loud and raucous music may be acceptable at a rock
concert or in the privacy of some people's homes; but the same music may be offensive in other
people's homes or in funeral or religious settings. "Annoy", "harass", "alarm", and "offend" will
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I
likely have different meanings to each member of a jury, notwithstanding the Court's attempts at
achieving defining instructions.

II.

MR. THOMPSON'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS HAS BEEN VIOLATED DUE TO
GROSSLY INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution is the basis for the right of a Defendant

to have effective assistance of counsel. Utah courts have consistently relied on the ruling of
Strickland v. Washington when deciding claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel under the
Federal Constitution. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,104 S.Ct 2052,80 L Ed2d 674 (1984).
(See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994); State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1993); State
v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (Utah), cert denied, 497 U.S.
1024,110 S.Ct. 3270 (1989); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989); Fernandez v. Cook, 783
P.2d 547 (Utah 1989) \ State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989); Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803
(Utah 1988); State v,. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909 (Utah 1988); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986)).
Strickland established a two-prong test in determining whether counsel for a defendant was
ineffective:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
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State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, at 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. at 687) (emphasis added). Both prongs of the test must be met for a court to affirm a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, when a defendant is represented by more than one
attorney the courts review the actions of all attorneys as a single representation when evaluating
ineffective assistance claims. State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, at 1254 (Utah 1993).
A.

Defense Counsel's Performance Was Deficient.

The first prong of the Strickland test is met by defendant "show[ing] that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In
this regard, the Utah Supreme Court has held, "[i]f counsel does not adequately investigate the
underlying facts of a case, including the availability of prospective defense witnesses, counsel's
performance cannot fall within the 'wide range of reasonable professional assistance5."
Templin, 805 P.2d at 188 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Templin Court has stated that "a decision
not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision." Templin, 805 P.2d at 188 (emphasis
added). In proving counsel's representation fell below an objective standard, Appellant cite's
specific instances of ineffectiveness which resulted in defendant not presenting an adequate defense
at trial.
The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct outline how an attorney should act in relation to a
client's case. "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client." URPC 1.3 (1981). "A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information." URPC 1.4(a) (1981). Mr.
Means did not even attempt to contact Appellant before the trial, this is contrary to his duty as a
licensed attorney.
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Mr. Means had reason to, but failed to investigate the issue of other threats made by Ms.
Thayer since Mr. Thompson shared information with Mr. Means in that regard. A simple
investigation would have given Appellant a great advantage in his case, proving that his intent in
calling Ms. Thayer was done with the purpose of protecting her.
1.

Lack of investigation is prima facie ineffective assistance of counsel.

Only after an adequate inquiry is made can counsel make a reasonable decision to call or not
to call particular witnesses for tactical reasons. Templin, 805 P.2d at 188.
If defense counsel would have investigated the case, ample evidence would have been found
to prove that Ms. Thayer had indicated suicidal tendencies before, thereby giving Mr. Thompson the
incentive to repeatedly call Ms. Thayer in order to protect her, and to protect Mr. Thompson's child.
Mr. Means, failed to consider the evidence that was proffered by Mr. Thompson, and was
thereby directly hindering Mr. Thompson's possibility of obtaining a fair trial. This disregard for
the client's interest, and failure to investigate is surely an issue that would have reversed the
conviction in this case.
2.

Counsel failed to attempt to impeach Ms. Thayer.

In representing a client, if an action by counsel is "below an objective standard for
reasonableness" (Strickland, Supra at 688 ) it is grounds for finding that counsel was ineffective in
representing the client. See Strickland, Supra. According to the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct,
an attorney is held to the strict duty of providing competent representation. See URPC 1.1 (1981).
The direct contradiction between Ms. Thayer's statement that she did not call Appellant on
the day in question (Tr. at 10), and the admitting that she had called him (Tr. at 27) was an obvious
indication of impeachment testimony. To fail to point out such a blatant contradiction in testimony
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is below the standard for reasonableness, and is unacceptable. This is especially true since the other
evidence offered by Mr. Thompson would have
B,

The Deficient Performance Prejudiced Mr. Thompson.

Mr. Thompson was found guilty of telephone harassment. (Tr. at 33). In ruling, the Judge
stated his view, "I think the only clear evidence is that there was an intent to annoy." (Tr. at 33). This
would have been directly disproved had defense counsel investigated, and presented evidence
tending to indicate that Ms. Thayer had dangerous propensities. The intent would have also been
disproved had defense counsel used the prior death threat made by Ms. Thayer to impeach her while
on the stand.
The error of failing to attempt to impeach, like the error of failing to investigate is not
harmless.

It was prejudicial to not attempt to impeach Ms. Thayer because "such strong

impeachment evidence would go to the central issue of the case..." State v. Martin, 984 P.2d 975,
979 (Utah 1999). The issue of Ms. Thayer's mental condition as pertaining to Mr. Thompson's
intent was directly at issue. The failure to expose the evidence of a
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Thompson requests that this Court reverse the conviction given the ruling of Provo v.
Whatcott, finding Utah Code Annotated §76-9-201 to be unconstitutional. Thompson has standing
to challenge the constitutionality of the telephone harassment statute as applied to the facts of his
case. He also has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on its face. The subject
statute has a real and substantial deterrent effect on protected speech and the statute is not readily
subject to a narrowing construction by the state's courts; therefore, it is unconstitutionally overbroad.
Additionally, the statute is unconstitutionally vague and cannot be cured by a narrowing judicial
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construction by the state's courts. Because the statute is overbroad and vague it must be stricken
down because it violates the guarantees of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
as well as Article I, Section 15 of the Constitution of Utah, and it cannot be applied to defendant or
anyone else.
Appellant's right of due process has been infringed by ineffective assistance of the counsel
that was appointed to him to represent his case. Appellant's counsel failed to adequately represent
him by inquiring sufficiently to offer evidence in support of his clam that Ms. Thayer had suicidal
tendencies, and that his calls were made in with good intentions. Appellant's attorney also failed
to diligently pursue the case since he failed to even make contact with the Appellant to ensure
efficient preparation to defend against the charge of telephone harassment. Additionally, defense
counsel was incompetent by not attempting to impeach Ms. Thayer based on her openly
contradictory statements.
Respectfully submitted this j_(_day of May, 2001.

^ A N A M. FACEMYER
Counsel for Appellant
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Addendum
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There is no addendum required in support of this brief.

•
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